Alexander the Great Avenger by Manousos E Kambouris;

Author:Manousos E Kambouris;
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: HISTORY / Military / Ancient
Publisher: Casemate Publishers & Book Distributors, LLC
Published: 2023-07-30T00:00:00+00:00

Chapter 11

The Battle of Issus

Line-up and approach of the Opponents

During the sea reconnaissance Alexander had his men rest and dine, until the situation was clarified, as the tempo of the operations seemed to accelerate. Cavalry (apparently light) and archers were dispatched in a hurry to re-secure the Syrian Gates (Arr Anab II.7,2). Being actually shut out of Cilicia in an area denuded by the imperial host, Alexander would have to pay in blood to conquer any small town or village. The reconnaissance mission returns with details and with reassuring news: Darius is there, with a most massive army, possibly his entire host. Alexander does not have to trouble with anything like soviet-era Operational Manoeuvre Groups going deep to his rear; nor is there any indication of the massive enemy host attempting anything threatening, such as trailing or pursuing the Macedonian army. And no trace of the fleet! Darius is there, and there only.

Alexander about-faced and conducted his approach in maximum security once more (Arr Anab II.8,1), passing the Gates under the eyes of his guards and then resting his troops on the spot under sentinels and pickets (Arr Anab II.8,2). The next morning, by dawn, he initiated his approach gradually deploying his phalanx as the space between the mountains and the sea opened; the infantry units approaching in the open deployed alternatively right and left (Arr Anab II.8,2) while the cavalry remains at the rear (Arr Anab II.8,3) until the whole line is deployed. This gradual deployment kept his flanks anchored on the seaside and the mountains, preventing any enemy unit slipping to his rear (Boardman 1999), a thought entertained by Darius, as evidently shown by the late disposition of his light infantry at the summit of Amanus, as mentioned later.

The infantry of the phalanx deployed initially 32-deep, then 16 – the normal assault depth (Polyb XVIII.30,1) – and then 8 (Polyb XII.19) to extend as much as possible. At this depth and mass it seems fragile, as will be discussed next, to the depth of the enemy phalanx of hoplites and ‘hoplitized’ kardaka. This suggests three things. First, that there is no indication of alternating Greek hoplite phalanx units among the taxeis of the Macedonian phalanx. Second, that the only way to sustain the frontal impact of the enemy, cavalry or infantry, may that remain static or deliver a charge, is by an asymmetric advantage and this can only be the use of the sarissa, thus ending all discussion on its use in this battle (Markle 1978) – a discussion erroneously starting in the first place as shown convincingly (Matthew 2015). Without the sarissa the battle would not have started, at least for the deployments and numbers reported by Arrian. And third, that only by assault could Alexander hope to deliver a decisive blow to the enemy, hoping by shock and momentum to shatter the determination and courage of less competent and confident enemy troops, especially the novice kardaka hoplites.

Alexander advanced slowly, to have time to observe and adapt, but also to enervate the opponent and let the terror from the flawless drill sink in.

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